



Remarks: The Declining Role of Outside Counsel in 
Enhancing Ethical Conduct by Corporations 
Jed S. Rakoff ∗ 
Much ink has been spilled in recent years on how to enhance ethical 
conduct on the part of corporations. The implicit assumption is that there 
exists a “culture” that is common to most corporations and that can be 
altered—such as by regulations imposed from without or incentives 
promulgated from within—so as to make the culture more favorable to 
ethical behavior. While everyday experience suggests that there are some 
institutional characteristics common to most corporate entities, I am not 
sure these commonalities are as important, so far as enhancing ethical 
conduct on the part of employees is concerned, as some of the variables. 
During the nearly two decades I was in private practice, I represented 
many corporations; and because my specialty was “white collar” crimi-
nal law, I represented them in matters where their employees’ ethical 
conduct was most being questioned. The reactions to such situations var-
ied considerably from corporation to corporation, and sometimes even 
changed radically in midstream, as when a CEO was deposed and re-
placed by a new one. If I were forced to generalize—which I find diffi-
cult to do—I would say that, while 100% of my corporate clients paid 
lip-service to observing the highest ethical standards, about half of them 
viewed doing so as a genuinely valuable asset (and even valuable in its 
own right); the other half simply viewed it as a necessary cost of doing 
business. I would be hard-pressed to explain why a given corporation fell 
into one or the other of these camps. 
During the same two decades, I also represented a fair number of 
high-level executives accused of regulatory and often criminal miscon-
duct, and some of them later “cut deals” and publicly admitted to the 
misconduct. The motivations for why they “did it” varied hugely from 
individual to individual; but only rarely were they affected by corporate 
culture in the sense that they took account of their companies’ ethical 
traditions and practices in making the calculation of whether, when and 
how to engage in misconduct. Indeed, some of my clients who were ex-
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ecutives in companies with strong traditions of ethical conduct nonethe-
less calculated that the “success” attendant on their bending the rules to 
enhance corporate profitability would materially better their positions in 
the companies. 
Of course, it would be a mistake for me or anyone else to generalize 
too much from their own happenstance experiences. But broader data 
suggest similar conclusions. In particular, the Department of Justice has 
been engaged for the past twenty years or so in an attempt to alter corpo-
rate culture through such devices as deferred prosecutions, enhanced 
compliance requirements, corporate monitorships, and the like—and the 
data suggest that they have achieved little. 
The most careful study of this is by Prof. Brandon Garrett in his 
book Too Big to Jail, which summarizes his detailed scrutiny of every 
deferred prosecution entered into by the federal government in the last 
two decades.1 What he finds, overall, is that a great many companies that 
entered into deferred prosecutions subsequently engaged in serious mis-
conduct, sometimes the very misconduct that first got them into trouble. 
For example, between 2002 and 2009, Pfizer Corporation entered into no 
fewer than four deferred prosecution agreements, all but the last of which 
was then followed by the company’s commission of the very misconduct 
the deferred prosecution agreements were designed to prevent.2 Prof. 
Garrett believes that this was because the deferred prosecution agree-
ments were not sufficiently enforced. But an alternative explanation is 
that such agreements are unlikely to change corporate culture, because 
such cultures are much more complicated than such agreements presup-
pose, because changing such a culture is much more difficult that the 
Government imagines, and because in any case the motivations of the 
executives who actually perpetrate the misconduct are only modestly 
affected by corporate culture. 
Given the apparent failure of such devices as deferred prosecutions, 
one might look for more creative alternatives for enhancing ethical prac-
tices within a corporation. I don’t have any to suggest—indeed, my own 
belief, often stated, is that the best deterrent of corporate crime has noth-
ing to do with trying to re-make corporate culture, but simply consists of 
criminally prosecuting and sending to prison the company employees 
and executives who actually commit the crimes. But, by way of suggest-
ing the kind of institutional device that might serve to enhance more eth-
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ical practices on the part of corporations, let me describe one such device 
that once helped serve this purpose but no longer does: the influence of 
outside counsel. 
For many decades prior to the 1970s, corporations and other large 
institutions had a more or less permanent relationship with particular law 
firms: that is to say, nearly all the legal work of corporation X was given 
to legal firm Y. IBM gave all its legal work to Cravath, Chase Bank gave 
all its legal work to Milbank Tweed, and so forth. Rarely did large corpo-
rations divide their legal work among several law firms. As for in-house 
legal staffs, these were typically quite small, and were usually staffed by 
former associates of the outside law firm that had referred them to the 
company. 
From an economist’s point of view, these practices reeked of ineffi-
ciency, but one thing they fostered was a very close relationship between 
the top executives at the company and the top partners at its chosen law 
firm—a relationship that fostered candor and trust. And typically the 
lawyers in such relationships viewed it as part of their “professional” 
duty to enhance ethical practices on the part of the corporate client. 
I witnessed an example of this in 1971 when, just two years out of 
law school, I was an associate at the large New York firm of Debevoise 
& Plimpton. A senior vice president at a corporation that had a long-term 
relationship with Debevoise had come up with a clever new business 
idea that would materially enhance the company’s profitability (and like-
ly would also increase his chances of becoming the next CEO). But when 
he ran the idea by the current CEO, the CEO told him to “check it with 
Oscar,” meaning Oscar Ruebhausen, a brilliant corporate lawyer who 
was the point-man at Debevoise for this particular client. So the execu-
tive sent a memo to Ruebhausen outlining his idea. Ruebhausen, in turn, 
asked a senior associate to research the lawfulness of the proposal, and 
the senior associate asked me to research an aspect of it. 
The senior associate concluded that, while the proposal was “tech-
nically” legal, it was directly contrary to the spirit and purpose of various 
relevant SEC regulations. He wrote a searing memo to Ruebhausen, stat-
ing that he considered the senior executive’s proposal “unethical” and 
“outrageous.” Oscar then asked the senior executive to come meet in his 
office and he also invited the senior associate and me to attend—I think 
as an object lesson as to how these situations should be handled. When 
the senior executive arrived, Mr. Ruebhausen congratulated him on the 
cleverness of his idea, and told him flat out that it did not technically vio-
late the law and that the firm could issue an opinion stating so. But he 
then proceeded to describe how the proposal might be “somewhat risky,” 
because it might offend the SEC, with which the company had to remain 
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on good terms in the long run. Moreover, Ruebhausen said, even though 
the proposal was technically legal, it was “close enough to the edge” that 
the class action bar might challenge it, and, he added, “You know what 
they are like.” Ruebhausen then proceeded to outline some changes to 
the proposal that, while somewhat reducing its profit potential, would 
make it much less risky. The executive immediately accepted the pro-
posed changes, and, it was my impression, left the meeting a happy man, 
knowing he would now get credit for a still-profitable new proposal that 
had “Oscar’s blessing.” 
The real effect of the changes that Ruebhausen had suggested was 
to eliminate all the ethical objections the senior associate had raised and 
bring the proposal well within the spirit of the applicable regulations. 
The senior associate and I fully understood this; even though 
Ruebhausen never mentioned ethical concerns in his meeting with the 
senior executive, we had no doubt that it was those ethical concerns that 
animated Ruebhausen’s professional advice. I feel certain that this same 
scenario was duplicated a thousand times at other large law firms in that 
era. I am equally sure that it would not be duplicated today. 
Why not? Because such relationships of candor and trust between 
law firms and their corporate clients are today a comparative rarity. The 
reasons for this trace to the late 1960s when, as a result of the new legis-
lation, regulations, and initiatives associated with the “Great Society,” 
the percentage of the budget of Fortune 500 companies devoted to legal 
matters increased over 300%.3 From the companies’ viewpoint, this was 
wasted money. Unlike, say, money spent on research, it did not yield 
profits even in the long-run. At best, it prevented losses; but usually not 
even that. As a result, prudent corporate executives looked for ways to 
reduce their legal expenses; the most obvious way was to bring routine 
legal work in-house. Thus, for example, between 1960 and 1995, the 
number of in-house lawyers at General Electric increased from 120 to 
more than 500.4 More generally, though estimates vary, there is general 
agreement that starting in the late 1960s, the number of in-house corpo-
rate lawyers greatly increased. 
In response, outside law firms, in order to remain profitable, be-
came highly specialized, because corporations would only use them for 
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the specialized work that their in-house lawyers were unable to perform. 
As a further result, law firms became known for particular specialties: 
Skadden Arps for M&A work, Weil Gotshal for bankruptcy work, etc. 
The combined result was that when corporations went outside for their 
legal work, which they now only did occasionally, they might use one 
firm for one kind of specialized work and another for a different kind of 
specialized work. 
The net of all this was the near-collapse of a relationship of trust 
and candor between corporations and their outside counsel. Nor was it 
replaced by a relationship of trust and candor between corporate execu-
tives and their inside general counsel; for, with some exceptions, such 
counsel—totally dependent on the high-ranking corporate executives for 
their pay, bonuses and very employment—were poorly situated to say 
“no” to new corporate initiatives. Given, moreover, the greatly enhanced 
competition among outside firms, even outside counsel were in no posi-
tion to say “no” either—for if they did, the corporation would just seek a 
“second opinion” from another firm eager to get the business. By the 
same token, the new kings of the outside law firms were the “rainmak-
ers” who brought in new business. One did not become a rainmaker by 
saying no to a company’s innovative proposals. 
In sum, the role once played by the fabled “lawyer-statesmen” of 
old in curbing corporate excess is largely a thing of the past. If effective 
alternatives are to be found, they will not, as indicated, take the form of 
deferred prosecutions. But what form they might take remains, at least to 
this writer, a mystery. 
